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Abstract:
This paper looks into socioeconomic factors affecting three racial groups within the United
States, and the possibility of their effects on rates of violent crime. This study incorporates US
census data in conjunction with FBI crime statistics in order to identify a correlation between
select sociological variables experienced by different racial groups, and the rates of violent crime
committed within those groups. Based on metropolitan areas by state for the year of 2012, the
results of this study show that socioeconomic and family factors have a significant effect on
violent crime rates regardless of race. Furthermore, violent crime rate gaps between minority
groups could decrease if the socioeconomic characteristics of their minority groups were
improved to that of the White racial group.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
For much of the 20th century, criminologists, economists, and sociologists alike have
studied years of societal and crime data in order to attempt to identify socioeconomic variations
that could serve as predictors of violent crime or crime in general. Homicide is viewed as one of
the most serious index crimes that the FBI reports in their yearly Uniform Crime Reports (UCR).
The reason being that although arrest data is normally subject to criticism for reporting
inaccuracy, homicide is more likely to be reported to the police and subsequently result in an
arrest (Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, 2002). A thesis identified by Blau and Blau (1982) that
unites these years of research is the notion that economic disadvantage is associated with violent
crime and homicide. According the Julie A. Phillips (2002), homicide is the leading cause of
death for Black males aged 15-24, and the second leading cause of death for Latinos males in the
same age group. This being so, there has to be identifiable reason for the large racial homicide
differential in the United States.
When attempting to explain the racial homicide differential, scholars generally point to
the fact that minorities (in many cases Blacks specifically) are more likely than Whites to be
unemployed, poor, grow up in single parent homes, and live in poor neighbourhoods. They are
more likely to live in segregated, more crime ridden communities than their White counterparts.
As stated by Phelps (2002), Empirical studies support that these socioeconomic characteristics
contribute to higher overall levels of homicide rates across cities and metropolitan areas of the
US. By looking the work done by Phillips (2002) and Tcherni (2011), this study aims to better
understand which structural and socioeconomic variables in particular are most related to rates of
violent crime in the US. By focusing on the works of Phillips (2002) and Tcherni (2011), this
study was able to come up with the theoretical framework for the model. The main determinants
identified through this framework for use in the model are as follows: family structure, poverty,
education, employment, income inequality, gun regulation, and the population of the three main
racial groups (Black, White, Latino). If the analysis finds that predicting variables to be
identifiable, significant policy changes could be called upon in order to decrease the rates of
violent crime across the country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 shows trends in observed
variables. Section 3 gives a brief literature review. Section 4 outlines the empirical model and

discusses the Data, while the empirical results are detailed in section 5, followed by a conclusion
in section 6.
2.0 TREND
Figure 1 shows the violent crime occurrences in the United States from 1992-2011. Excluding a
slight rise in the period of time after 2003 and ending in 2007, the trend of occurrences of violent
crime has been on the decline. One would think that the economic downturn of 2008 would spur
a rise in violent crime for the observed year of 2009, however, the amount of homicides
following that time period dropped further.
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Unemployment serves as an explanatory variable when it comes to crime rates because
people who do not have jobs get desperate and can turn violent to get what they need. The
research done for this paper suggests that unemployment levels in a community are indicative of
crime rate, however, it is the structural disadvantage of not being able to get a job that is a better
indicator. Figure 2 below shows the trend in the unemployment rate in the US over the past 14
years. On a national level, you would expect to see crime rates start to rise in correlation with
this more extended rise in the unemployment rate. However, according to the Figure 1 above,

this is not true. There is a possibility that the scope of focus is too broad and not narrow enough
to escape being bogged down by averages in order to capture the differences in cities or states
alone.

Source: http://portalseven.com/employment/unemployment_rate_u6.jsp
Lastly, the trend in the rate of divorce Figure 3, in our country is constantly changing.
Leading up to 2005, there was a sharp decline in the amount of people getting divorced in our
country per 1,000 people. From 2005 to 2006 there is a slight increase until falling back down to
a lower rate of under 3.5 during the financial crisis, possibly because people couldn’t afford to
support their families alone, choosing to stay together instead of splitting up. Once the economy
moved into recovery however, this trend started to reverse. Divorce is an important variable in
discussing determinants of homicide rates. Divorce breaks up families and deviates time and
focus away from raising children properly. This makes them susceptible to getting involved in
the wrong crowds and potentially becoming a criminal that commits and act of homicide.
Divorce also creates animosity between ex-spouses and/or the ex-spouses’ new lovers. Love is a
powerful emotion, and if emotions flare enough it can lead to violent behaviour and even
homicide. Divorce would likely be a leading indicator, seeing as though the children growing up
in a divorced household still have another 5-10 years before they can start to potentially engage

in illicit activity, so the trend in divorce would likely not coincide with the rate of violent crime.
However, the number of separated households would be much more likely to align with the rate
of violent crimes because they take into account households that were already separated and not
ones that have recently been separated.
Figure 3
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Violent crime, and homicide rates in particular have been on the decline in our country in the last
decade. Gun laws have gotten more strict in many states across the country allowing fewer guns
to people that do not deserve to have them. Abortion was legalized in 1973, accounting for as
much as 50 percent of the recent drop in crime (Donohue and Levitt 2000). Overall, things are
looking up. However, the homicide rate gap between different races is significant and must be
studied in order to implement policies and changes that would bring about a decrease in the
racial homicide gap.
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
Over the years there have been many proposed explanations for the differences in crime
rates between different racial groups. Poverty has come to be largely identifiable with groups
that commit crime. Those people who have little to lose have much more to gain through crime,
especially in the form of robbery related crime. Brush (2007) stated that inequitable allocations

of resources can incite criminal activity, because people may be driven to crime by a lack of
necessary resources. Eitle et al. (2006) asserts that poverty concentration may not be the optimal
measure when used to explain variation in race-specific homicide rates. In referencing the work
of Wilson (2003), Eitle et al. (2006) argues that the outcomes of disadvantage are
economic/structural disadvantage (in the form of lack of access to jobs…etc.) as well as sociopsychological, in that they have low aspirations and negative social dispositions. This can
contribute to the explanation for homicide rates in that violent behavior is seen as a normal
adaptive response in such disadvantaged positions, and in disadvantaged communities, the social
control system for such behavior is not there. Poverty on its own cannot serve to be an
explanation of homicide rates. However, distribution of wealth or income inequality is often
cited as being a strong explanatory variable for crime as well.
Similar to poverty, employment is a measure of how many people are currently working
at a job. Unemployment is the amount of people who are not in a job, but are still in the labor
force looking to get work. Harris et al. 2012 put forth the assumption of the fact that
predominantly White localities rarely ever approach the levels of disadvantage found in
predominantly Black and Hispanic areas. This makes it difficult to compare the race specific
levels of violence. However, there exists a considerable amount of variation between sizes of
racial differences in levels of structural disadvantage. Agnew (1999) alleged that group level
structural disadvantage produces greater social and psychological strains among group members,
which then produces differences in rates of violent crime between groups. Unemployment, like
poverty, erodes local systems of informal social control, and can foster subcultures that favor
violence.
Chintrakarn and Herzer (2012) summarize in their work that most studies on income
inequality are confirmatory in that economic incentives for crime is much higher in areas with
greater inequality. Income inequality is the measure of how evenly wealth is distributed
throughout an area. High inequality in a region means that individuals there are either very rich
or very poor. Areas with lower inequality are all living on similar wages. In places with high
income inequality, those who are poor have little to lose from attempting to take from those who
have much more to lose. Whether they do so in a violent manner or not is something that can be
observed through the measured homicide rate in the respective area. In her paper, Brush (2007)
found that there was a significant positive relationship between the Gini coefficient and crime

rates when controlling for other variables. However, Chintrakarn and Herzer (2012), running a
different measure of income inequality, found that the long-run effect of income inequality had a
crime reducing effect. They explained this by stating that rising income inequality may be
associated with increased demand for protection from crime, reducing the returns to crime. This
may account for a drop in homicides against Whites, but it doesn’t explain homicide levels
experienced by Black and Hispanics.
Phillips (2002) harped on social disorganization theory, which suggests that AfricanAmericans and Hispanics are not inherently predisposed to violent crime. Instead, it is the social
conditions where they live that lead to high homicide rates. This theory implies that if the
socioeconomic characteristics of African-American, Hispanic, Asian, and Caucasian
neighborhoods were controlled for, the racial/ethnic homicide differentials would be reduced or
disappear. Therefore, there have to be other variables that explain the homicide differentials.
Wall and Web (2008) identify education as being an important indicative variable of homicide
rates, saying that in neighborhoods with low levels of education the homicide rates are much
higher. This is because the youth living in these areas have fewer employment prospects, have
low expectations for their future, and thusly believe they have little to lose if they engage in
violent crime. Poverty and education can be linked in this way, Tcherni (2011) talks about how
poverty creates social disorganization in an impoverished area. She goes on to explain that
poverty stricken regions lack the funds for educational programs and after school activities, and
due to lack of supervision in those communities, the youth have opportunities to occupy their
free time with what they chose. More often than not, what they chose to do is what other people
in the community are doing, and in places where there is social disorganization, that more often
or not is vice, prostitution, drug trade and use…etc. It is a cyclical scenario, and the young
people exposed to it are exposed to higher incidences of interpersonal conflicts that can lead to
violence and occasionally homicide.
Family structure is another important variable to look at when analyzing causal variables
in regard to homicide. Divorce or separation is a major structural force that often results in the
disruption of a traditional two-parent family and creates a “broken home” (Tcherni 2011). Single
parents lack the economic resources, time, or energy necessary to maintain their own lives, never
mind the life of theirs or someone else’s children. These children grow up in a much less socially
controlled environment, and can potentially develop negatively. Not only can this be taken from

the child’s point of view, but as Tcherni (2011) references, on an interpersonal level, family
disruption can increase violence because of the documented relationship between divorce and
elevated levels of interpersonal violence involving estranged spouses or ex-spouses and their
new partners.
Firearm possession is a legal right in this country. In most states your right is only valid if
you have the proper licensing. Seeing as though most gun crime occurs with an illegal firearm,
this paper did not focus on licensed firearm owners. Instead, this study looked at gun law
strictness by state. The theory behind this is that those states with lower levels of gun control
could potentially have a smaller rate of homicides committed. Deterrence is a powerful tool, and
states that have more relaxed gun laws are more likely to have people carrying guns on their
person at all times. In addition, many of these states have adopted “Castle Doctrine” laws, which
allow an individual the right to be anywhere they are, and anyone that threatens that is liable to
be shot. According to Cheng and Hoekstra (2012), these laws alter incentives by reducing the
expected cost of using lethal force, as well as increasing the expected cost of committing a
violent crime. In their paper, Cheng and Hoekstra (2012) find that the level of homicides in states
with this doctrine actually increased. Therefore, the variable for gun control could potential be
very telling in this model.
These variables, structural and socioeconomic, will be analyzed within the model in
conjunction with population differences between the three main racial groups (Black, White, and
Latino). O’Flaherty and Stehi (2010) report that African Americans are six times as likely as a
White American to die at the hands of a murderer, and roughly seven times as likely to murder
someone compared to their White counterpart. Young Black men are at even more risk, roughly
15 times as likely to be murdered as young White men. According to the US Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Blacks are about 2.7 times as likely as Whites to be poor, 2.2 times as likely to drop
out of high school, and 2.7 times as likely to grow up in a single parent household. Hispanics are
more likely to be murdered than Whites, but less likely to be murdered than Blacks. This is
strange seeing how Hispanics and Blacks share similar poverty and dropout rates. This study
aims to identify the variables that are predictive of violent crime rates in general, and to better
understand where the difference lies between different racial groups.

4.0 DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
4.1 Data
The study uses year end annual data of the 50 United States from the years of 2005, 2009, and
2012. Data were mainly obtained from the United States Census Bureau website, the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Reporting website, and ancillary data was collected from the Brady Campaign
for Gun Violence protection website, as well as the Population Reference Bureau’s website.
Summary statistics for the data from years 2005, 2009, and 2012 can be found in tables 1, 2, and
3 respectively.
Table 1 Summary Statistics 2005
Variable

Obvs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Violent Crime rate

51

420.69

221.37

111.00

1,380.00

Total Population

51

Family Structure

51

12.64

1.36

9.70

15.00

Poverty

51

9.94

2.88

5.30

16.80

Education

51

28.18

3.86

17.30

36.20

Employment

51

4.33

0.75

2.70

6.20

Gun Regulation

51

17.39

22.92

0

85.00

Income Inequality

51

0.45

0.023024

0.41

0.537

Black Population

51

12%

12.90%

0%

60.00%

White Population

51

76%

14.10%

0.24%

94.03%

Hispanic Population

51

9%

9.42%

0%

42.69%

5,813,863 6,566,296 508,798 36,154,147

Table 2 Summary Statistics 2009
Variable

Obvs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Violent Crime rate

51

406.54

205.62

119.90

1,348.90

Total Population

51

Family Structure

51

12.93

1.45

9.10

16.00

Poverty

51

9.97

2.80

5.50

17.30

Education

51

29.74

4.01

18.60

37.20

Employment

51

5.92

1.25

2.60

9.30

Gun Regulation

51

17.39

22.92

0

85

Income Inequality

51

0.45

0.02243

0.402

0.532

Black Population

51

12%

11.40%

0%

53.22%

White Population

51

78%

13.56%

0.27%

95.75%

Hispanic Population

51

10%

9.89%

0.01%

45.57%

6,019,736 6,780,646 544,270 36,961,664

Table 3 Summary Statistics 2012
Variable

Obvs.

mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Violent Crime rate

51

371.27

178.66

122.7

1243.7

Total Population

51

Family Structure

51

13.55

1.56

10.6

17

Poverty

51

15.22

3.27

10

24.2

Education

51

29.97

4.01

17.2

37.2

Employment

51

5.44

1.16

2.3

7.9

Gun Regulation

51

17.39

22.92

0

85

Income Inequality

51

0.46

0.02

0.417

0.534

Black Population

51

11.19%

10.95%

0.40%

49.50%

White Population

51

76.93%

13.69%

24.90%

95.10%

Hispanic Population

51

10.97%

10.03%

1.30%

47%

6,155,177 6,974,697 576,412 38,041,430

4.2 Empirical Model
Following Phillips (2002) this study adapted and modified the study of homicide rates by
race (Black, White, and Latino). This model has a different focus, in that it excludes culture
specific variables, as well as measures for segregation, work environments, and information that
focuses on specific metropolitan areas. In contrast, this study puts much more emphasis on
socioeconomic variables of the 50 states studied. This study has taken a cross-sectional data
approach over three separate years, (2005, 2009, and 2012). These years were chosen in
accordance with years that represent three different economic situations in the United States.
According to Phillips (2002), both White and Black homicide offending and victimization rates
are higher in places with relatively high levels of structural disadvantage and social disruption.
Therefore, this study uses data from three different years in order to represent varying levels of
country wide prosperity, hardship, and recovery. 2005 was chosen as a year in which the country
was experiencing strong economic growth, 2009 was chosen as a year in which the country was
enduring a recession as a result of the burst of the housing market bubble, and 2012 was chosen
as a year in which the country was recovering from the recession that started in 2008.
The model for this study could be written as follows:
𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽𝑽 = 𝜷𝜷𝟎𝟎 + 𝜷𝜷𝟏𝟏 𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭𝑭 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 +

𝜷𝜷𝟒𝟒 𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 + 𝜷𝜷𝟓𝟓 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮 + 𝜷𝜷𝟔𝟔 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰 + 𝜷𝜷𝟕𝟕 𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹𝑹+∈

VCR, the dependent variable in focus, is the rate of violent crime in each state per
100,000 people. The definition of the violent crime rate is consistent with the definition put in
place by the US Department of Justice and the FBI. More specifically, it is a measure comprised
of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault. Violent crimes are those offenses that involve force or threat of force. The study done by
Phillips (2002) specifically focused on the rate of homicide, and in particular, homicide
differentials between the different races. However, this study instead focuses on violent crime in
order to encompass a wider variety of crime sources. Violent crime was also chosen in order to
bypass the potential for under-reporting of homicide data as victims or witness of more “minor”
crime might be more apt to report what they know to the police.

Independent variables, a complete list of which can be found in table 4, consist of
eleven variables obtained from various sources. Table 4 provides data source, acronyms,
descriptions, and expected signs. First, State, is purely the state in which the date is sampled
from on a year to year basis. Second, POP is a measure of the size of the population of each
corresponding state, this data is obtained from the US Census. The third variable FAM is a
measure of family structure and stability. This variable is the sum of families that have been
divorced as well as separated obtained from the US Census. Numerous empirical studies in the
past as well as social control theory suggest that there is an important association between family
disruption and rates of homicide (Phillips 2012). Socioeconomic status is captured with the
fourth variable POV as a measure of the amount of poverty in the state, or the percent of families
living below the poverty line as specified by the US census. In addition to level of poverty as a
determinant of socioeconomic status, the fifth variable EDU is a measure of the level of
educational attainment of people in each state. This variable is measured as the percent of people
ages 25+ that have attended some college or have obtained an associate’s degree. Deprivation is
often a motivator for crime, and in order to measure for this, the sixth variable INC as a measure
of income inequality is utilized. The Gini coefficient measures the amount of income inequality
on a scale of 0-1, and is used to find relative deprivation. Socioeconomic disadvantage is also
analyzed through the use of the seventh variable EMPLOY, or the rate of employed individuals
aged 16 and up. According to Phillips (2002), strain or blocked opportunity theory suggests that
absolute and relative deprivation may lead to frustration that is ultimately manifested in
aggressive behavior. For this reason, these variables that measure absolute and relative
deprivation have been chosen for their theoretical direct relationship with aggressive behavior
and therefore violent crime. For the eighth variable, relative severity of state gun control laws is
observed. This is measured on a scale of 0-100 in order to identify if ease of access to guns has a
positive effect on violent crime or acts as a deterrent. The last three variables BPOP, WPOP, and
HPOP are variables that identify the percent of the population in the area that is Black, White, or
Hispanic. Phillips (2012) notes that Massey and Denton (1993) among others, argue that a way
in which residential segregation contributes to violence is through social and cultural isolation of
certain minority groups. These variables are used in order to infer if certain levels or “mixes” of
these races contributes to violence more than others.

Table 4 List of Variables
Acronym

Variable & Definition

State

State

Census

POP

Population

Census

VCR

Violent Crime Rate

UCR

FAM

Family Structure

Census

(% divorced + Separate) ages 15+
Pov
EDU

Expected Sign of Coefficient

Source

+

Poverty

Census

(% of families below the poverty line)

+

Education attainment

-

Census

(Some college or associate’s)
EMPLOY

Employment
(Rate of unemployment ages 16+)

GUN
INC

Census
+

Gun Regulation

Bradley Campaign

(Strictness of state’s gun laws 0-100)

+/-

Income Inequality

+

PRB

+/-

Census

+/-

Census

+/-

Census

(Gini coefficient 0-1)
BPOP

Black Population
(% of total population)

WPOP

White Population
(% of total population)

HPOP

Hispanic Population
(% of total population)

5.0 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical estimation results for years 2005, 2009, and 2012 are presented in Tables
5, 6, and 7 respectively. The empirical estimation shows the positive and negative relationships
between the different measures of socioeconomic status, deprivation, and culture on the level
rate of violent crime by each state over the three years mentioned. In looking at the summary
statistics represented on tables 1, 2, and 3, it can be seen that the average violent crime rate from
2005 to 2012 has diminished. This comes as a surprise and counters strain or blocked theory,
which would have predicted that in times of economic struggle, people would be forced to
violent behavior reflective of their deprived economic position. Average total population grew
from year to year as expected. It was predicted prior to this study that the family structure
variable would vary in accordance with economic up/downturns. Times of plenty leading to a
higher rate of divorce, and times of hardship leading to fewer divorces. In looking at just these
three years, it is clear that the family structure variable increased through all of the years, less so
in 2009 and more so in 2012, but the observation of just three years is limiting in this respect.
The poverty rate variable would be expected to have risen in 2009 and started to decline in 2012,
however, the rate rose slightly from 2005 to 2009, and jumped largely in 2012. Education rose
throughout the selected years slowly, however, the importance of education in today’s rapidly
evolving business environment is growing in importance, so this growth makes sense. The rate of
unemployment fluctuated as predicted, rising in times of hardship (2008) and lowering in times
of prosper (2012 recovery). Gun regulation was constant throughout, and income inequality, on
average, stayed stable. Lastly, in looking at populations of racial groups, the racial group with
noticeable gain in share of the population over time was the Hispanic group.

Table 5: Regression results for 2005
Variable

Coefficient
-984.1005

Constant

-1150.71
-3.90E-06

POP

-4.30E-06
32.37741

FAM

-21.92392
-19.76344

POV

-14.24142
-5.910443

EDU

-8.815974

T-Statistic
-0.85521

0.3975

-0.90783

0.3694

1.476807
-1.38774
-0.67042

91.05329

EMPLOY

2.3056

-39.49224
-1.448057

GUN

-1.780168
3634.847

INC

-2106.852
-251.1255

BPOP

-388.5348
-812.8811

WPOP

-409.1994
333.2198

HPOP

-359.7567

Included observations: 51

Prob.

-0.81344
1.725251
-0.64634
-1.98652
0.926237

R2 0.628299

Note: *** , **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses

0.1476
*
0.1729
*
0.5064
0.0264
**
0.4208
0.0922
*
0.5218
0.0539
**
0.3599

Table 6: Regression results for 2009
Variable

Coefficient
-1399.406

C

-1045.436
-7.52E-06

POP

-3.99E-06
26.05308

FAM

-22.58604
-13.39048

POV

-13.98415
1.542578

EDU

-8.412557
33.23722

EMPLOY

-22.07038
-0.967734

GUN

-1.967244
3736.791

INC

-2075.194
444.2756

BPOP

-278.9252
-483.6879

WPOP

-233.4551

t-Statistic
-1.33859
-1.88606

0.0666
**
0.2555

-0.95755

0.344

0.183366

0.8554

1.505965
-0.49192
1.800695
1.592812
-2.07187

-276.4834

Included observations: 51

0.1883

1.153503

566.6886

HPOP

Prob.

2.04963

R2
0.607642

Note: *** , **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses

0.1399
*
0.6255
0.0793
**
0.1191
*
0.0448
**
0.047
**

Table 7: Regression results for 2012
Variable

Coefficient

t-Statistic

-602.845

C

-967.5089
-6.13E-06

POP

-3.57E-06
23.57642

FAM

-21.92439
-6.198955

POV

-11.28384
0.232686

EDU

-8.403453
-5.682873

EMPLOY

-28.91051
0.758426

GUN

-2.05516
1785.959

INC

-1976.053
746.0034

BPOP

-391.1891
-217.5048

WPOP

-244.4618
556.4607

HPOP

-283.7764

Included observations: 51

-0.62309
-1.71778

0.5368
0.0936
*

1.075351

0.2887

-0.54937

0.5858

0.027689

0.978

-0.19657

0.8452

0.369035

0.714

0.903801

0.3715

1.907015
-0.88973
1.960913

R2
0.538446

Note: *** , **, and * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses

Prob.

0.0637
**
0.3789
0.0569
**

The objective of this study was to analyze state by state data over three separate years in
order with the goal of identifying potential socioeconomic indicators of violent crime. The years
used were chosen to represent three different stages of the United States economy, (boom,
recession, recovery), and see if these factors had any effect on the independent variables in those
years, and then consequently the dependent variable of violent crime.
Though many of these variable had expected outcomes from previous empirical studies
and social theories, not all of them were realized in this study. In looking at the regression
outcomes from year to year, not all of the expected correlations remained constant. In table 5
(2005), FAM, EDU, EMPLOY, and INC all followed the predicted correlations, however,
surprisingly, poverty did not. In the year 2005, it was found that FAM, POV, and INC were
significant at the 10% level, and EMPLOY and WPOP were significant at the 5% level. Moving
forward to table 6 (2009) a year of recession in the US, the EDU variable does not align with the
predicted outcome. FAM, EMPLOY, and INC still reflect previous predictions, however, POV
and EDU do not. It would be theorized that a higher rate of education would decrease the level of
crime in an area, however, this outcome opposes that idea. In this year, EMPLOY has statistical
significance at the 10% level, and INC, WPOP, and HPOP, show significance at the 5% level.
Moving on to the last year of the study, (2012) Table 7, it can be seen that EMPLOY this time
has dropped out from predicted correlation as well, leaving only FAM and INC as the only
variables that maintained their predicted correlations with violent crime. In this year, the only
variables that are statistically significant are BPOP and HPOP at the 5% level.
Although not statistically significant at each of the three years incorporated into this
study, it appears that the variables that most constantly align with the predictions of correlation
made in this study are the FAM and INC variables. In 2005, a 1 unit increase in family structure
(divorce & separated) yields an increase in violent crime rate by 32.377. In 2009, a 1 unit
increase yields a 26.053 increase in violent crime, and in 2012, a 1 unit increase yields an
increase in violent crime of 23.5754. Focusing on income inequality, in 2005, a 1 unit increase in
income inequality yields a 3634.847 increase in violent crime, while in 2009, that number jumps
to have an effect of 3736.791 on violent crime, and finally in 2012, the yield on violent crime
decreases to 1785.959 per a 1 unit increase in income inequality. Coefficients on populations by
race were mostly inconsistent, however, WPOP was negative throughout all 3 years, signifying

that as the population percentage of Whites rose, the rate of violent crime in that area would
decrease. In all years excluding 2012, gun strictness laws decreased the rate of violent crime,
aligning with preconceived notions that controlled access to guns lowered the rate of crime.
Interpreting these results in terms of relative change in the independent variable leads to
three main points of focus. First, the variable INC or income inequality maintains statistical
significance in two out of the three years of focus (2005, 2009). Between the two of these years,
income inequality was significant at 10% and 5% respectively. Both years, income inequality
resulted in the expected positive correlation between INC and VCRIME. Secondly, the variable
EMPLOY or rate of unemployment is statistically significant in two out of the three years of
focus as well, (2005, 2009). Significance in these two years was 5% and 10% respectively.
Similarly, as expected, the positive correlation between EMPLOY and VCRIME help constant
and consistent with the work done by Phillips. Lastly, population by race was significant
throughout all three years of observation, however, their statistical significance varied in each
year, as did the specifics of which race population variable. All three race variables (BPOP,
WPOP, HPOP) were expected to be unforeseeable in how they were to correlate with VCRIME.
As it turns out, WPOP was significant in two out of the three years (2005, 2009) at 5% in each
year. HPOP was significant at 5% in two of the three years (2009, 2012), and BPOP was 5%
significant in 2012. Though the signs were anticipated to be unpredictable, WPOP maintained a
negative correlation with VCRIME in the years of 2005 and 2009, while HPOP and BPOP had a
positive correlation with VCRIME in each respective variable’s years of statistical significance.
The Variables for family structure and poverty were significant at the 10% level in the year of
2005 alone. These findings will be further analyzed in the conclusion section that follows.
6.0 CONCLUSION
This study attempts to determine if there are socioeconomic variables that have a
quantifiable effect on violent crime rates across the United States of America. This study was
modeled after a study done by Julie A Philips, published in 2002, entitled White, Black, and
Latino Homicide Rates: Why the Difference?. This study differs from Phillips’ work in that the
goal was to identify which specific socioeconomic variables had the greatest quantifiable
correlations to the dependent variable “violent crime” that was used in place of “rate of
homicide”. Criminological theories discussed today suggest that most of the difference in rates of

homicides across racial groups is due largely to the different socioeconomic conditions in which
the different racial demographics live (Phillips 2002). For this reason, this study also differs from
Phillips’ in that the focus was not on variation between the three different racial groups, but
rather between different societal conditions and make-ups (by state), and using the variables
BPOP, HPOP, and HPOP to serve as a descriptor of the demographic make-up on a state by state
basis. Using Philips’ research, as well as guidelines suggested by criminology theory, the set of
variables selected for this study were believed to be the best socioeconomic predictors of violent
crime rates.
As expected, income inequality as well as rate of unemployment were variables that had
statistically significant effects on rates of violent crime. Income inequality is commonly referred
to as the gap between the rich and the poor. Areas with a high measure of inequality are areas in
which very poor people are situated amongst wealthy individuals. On the other hand, the rate of
unemployment is a measure of the rate of individuals who are currently in the labor force and are
out of work. Both of these variables are measures of absolute and relative deprivation. Phillips’
work highlights that strain or blocked opportunity theory suggests that these types of deprivation
lead to frustration that can be manifested in aggressive behavior. Therefore, it can be said that
those individuals who live in areas where there are large amounts of unemployed individuals
searching for jobs that might not exist, are statistically more likely to live in an area with a higher
rate of violent crime. Furthermore, it can also be said, that individuals living in areas where there
are high concentrations of poverty and wealth mixed together, are also more likely to live in an
area with higher rates of violent crime. These findings and the direction of their correlations
agree with previous studies, including, but not limited to Phillips’ work on variation in homicide
rates.
Although the measures of family structure (FAM) and level of poverty (POV) prove to be
statistically significant solely in 2005, it is important to include these variables in the discussion.
Poverty for this study measured the rate of people living under a certain level of income (the
poverty line) that is set by the US Government. Areas with higher rates of poverty often
experience similar hardships and frustrations that those individuals living in areas with higher
levels of income inequality experience, as well as those living in areas with higher
unemployment. In fact, high unemployment can be directly related to levels of poverty, and for
this purpose, this study incorporated data from years of varying economic conditions in order to

examine for between years with varying rates of unemployment. This study reveals that rate of
poverty is an identifiable determinant in the levels of violent crime, however, contrary to
previous studies, it is found in this model to be negatively correlated with the rate of violent
crime. The margin of error for two out of three of the coefficient results for poverty can swing
this variable in a positive direction, therefore it is inconclusive as to if poverty is relatable to
violent crime in a positive manner. Family structure in this study was a proxy for the sum of the
rate of families divorced or separated. Social control theory states that there is an important
association between rates of family separation and homicide rates. As predicted, there was a
consistent positive correlation between family structure and violent crime. Although this variable
wasn’t statistically significant through all years, the results agree with previous studies, and this
study finds that family structure is an important positively correlated determinant of violent
crimes rates.
Measures of the three main ethnic groups were statistically significant in different years.
Direction of correlation was not predicted prior to this study, however, two of the three groups
had constant correlations throughout the three years observed. The variable measuring White
population was consistently negative throughout the three years of observation, while the
Hispanic population was positive throughout the three years. The measure of the Black
population varied slightly, in that it was negative in 2005 and then positive in 2009 and 2012.
Although much more detailed and specific study would have to be done to determine the
complexities behind this observation, these results can be explained with a more simple “on the
surface” interpretation. As Phillips pointed out, statistically speaking, large numbers of Hispanics
and Blacks live in extremely disadvantaged neighborhoods. This, holding true, means that
Hispanics and Blacks are more likely to live in disadvantaged areas with higher rates of poverty
and unemployment, which this study has identified as determinants of violent crime rates.
Whites in this country, historically speaking, have been on the other side of the spectrum. Living
in better areas yields better chances of making a better living, and getting away from areas with
higher rates of violent crime.
In summary, this study finds a clear connection between poor socioeconomic conditions
and higher rates of violent crime, (identifying income inequality and unemployment
specifically). Previous research indicates that the additional variables used in this study are
equally important in determining the rates of violent crimes in different areas, however, this

study’s results did not yield the same. This is most likely caused by the lack of access to perfect
data, and imperfections in data reporting. This conclusion provides for some promising ideas for
policymakers, specifically in regard to policies that would improve socioeconomic conditions for
all minority groups. For example, things like improving levels of education across the board,
lowering the rate of unemployment, and reducing the levels of poverty experienced in this
country could have a significant impact on the rates of violent crime committed in this country.
Future research should go into greater detail by looking at data by each specific racial group with
focus on smaller geographical areas and communities.
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Background
• Population: 5,848,641
•

Capital: Managua, 934,000

• Government type: Republic
• Chief of State: Daniel Ortega – Sandinista Liberation Front
• Language: Spanish
• Currency: Cordoba  24.77/$1USD
• Principal industries: agriculture, chemicals, machinery and metal products,
knit and woven apparel

• Exports: commodities (coffee, beef, gold, cotton, sugar, tabacco)
• Main trading partners: US 55.6%, Canada 8.6%, Venezuela 7.3%, El Salvador
4.2%

Economic Data
• GDP: $27.86 billion US, real growth rate 4.2%
•
•

GDP per capita (PPP) $4,500
Inflation: 7.4%

• Budget: 2.885 billion in revenue, 2.918 in expenditure
• Unemployment: 7.2%
• Population below poverty line: 42.5%
• Income inequality: 40.5 (Gini index)
• Public debt: 57.4% of GDP
• External debt: $8.16 billion

Economic Data (Cont)
• Health expenditure: 10.1% of GDP
• Infant mortality rate: 20.36/1000
• Labor force: 3.039 million
•
•

28+% agriculture
19% industry

Current Problem(s)
• Dependency on export crops for economic development
• Marginalized domestic food production
•

Half of the population lacks food security

• Corruption

• Three main periods:
•
•
•

Zelaya’s liberal nationalist agrarian policy 1894-1909
Somoza’s agro-capitalism 1910-1978
Sandinista idealism 1979-1990

• Primary causes highlighted:
•
•
•

History

US manipulation and conflict
World Bank & IMF interests
Dictatorships and corruption

Zalaya’s Liberal Nationalist Agrarian Policy 18941909
• Realized high demand for coffee in the world market. Shifted all resources
to support the agro-export sector

• High coffee prices drove all farmers away from normal food production
• Zalaya transferred 1,300,000 hectares of land to 30 elite families for coffee
production

• Thousands of peasants left landless, turn to cheap seasonal labor
• Legislation ruling 3 options: military, public project work, or coffee
production

• Malnutrition, declining health, scarcity of food

Somoza’s Agro-Capitalism 1910-1978

• Corrupt dictator with a capitalist philosophy
• Economic growth driven by agro-capitalism masked the decline in food
production and distribution.

•

More than 50% of the population without food security

• Reinforced the class structure, expanding Nicaragua’s competitive
advantage in coffee and cotton.

• High prices yielded high profit, but no wealth was put into fiscal budget.
•

Rampant corruption, no trickledown effect. Top 5% enjoyed 28% of the income,
bottom 50% got 15%

• Forced people off their land, gave it to an elite few, and ordered them to
work as wage labor

Somoza’s Agro-Capitalism (Cont)
• In 1978, 37% of the active rural population was landless, half couldn’t find
work

• Coffee has potential for other crops to be grown with it, cotton does not.
•

Somoza orders remaining fertile land to be planted with cotton.

•

Redistribution to agro-export producers as subsidies and incentives

• Profits gained were not reinvested

• Wealthy crop producers grew wealthier, the poor fell deeper into poverty
• “Comparative advantage” meant specialization in agro-exports at the
expense of food crop production

Sandinistas 1979-1990
Nicaraguan revolution

• Violent ousting of Somoza dictatorship
• Agrarian reform again. Goals of self-sufficiency in basic grain production by
90s and 2000s

•

Failure, incompatible with export oriented structure of the agro-export sector

• Further complicated by:
•
•
•

Being challenged by anti-Sandinistas
U.S. backed Contras
Economic blockade by U.S. government

• Centralization of economic planning and market controls seen by U.S. as
communist influence.

• Highly dependent on multilateral aid and loans.

Sandinistas 1979-1990 (Cont)
• Coffee prices drop
•

IMF and World Bank encouraged new countries to produce coffee

•

Turned to printing money as a solution

• Financial assistance from the Soviet Bloc
• Not able to solve budget problems

• Hyperinflation – devastating
• Stagnant poverty rates, malnutrition, high debt
• Extremely volatile economy, needed diversification

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Recent History: Post Sandinistas
1990: National opposition union (US backed) defeats FSLN in elections,
Violeta Chamorro becomes president
1992: HUGE earthquake, 16,000 left homeless
2002: Daniel Ortega re-elected
2004: World bank wipes 80% of Nicaragua's debt to the institution.
2004: Russia writes off Nicaragua's multibillion dollar soviet era debt
2006: Free trade deal with US CAFTA
2006: Plans unveiled to build ship canal linking Atlantic and Pacific oceans
2006: Daniel Ortega re-elected again
2009: Ortega announces plan to change constitution to allow him to stand
for another term

•

Then lifted

• 2011: Ortega re-elected for another 5 year term.

Reflecting
•

Attempts to use export agriculture as an engine of growth led to
reallocation of land, labor, credit, and knowledge of food cultivation.

• Nicaragua’s economy is largely based off of volatile world market prices of
coffee and cotton

• Dependency on food aid and foreign loans
•

Caught in the system, having to bend to demands of international entities

• Political corruption, questionable U.S. foreign policy, and natural disasters
extremely detrimental

Looking Forward
• Daniel Ortega must be monitored
• Delegation of power to rural communities
• Resolve land tenure program
• Strengthen the financial sector
• Initiate a micro-finance system
• Improve infrastructure
• Introduce nutrition programs

Looking Forward (Cont)
• Increase off-farm employment
• Buffer stock of grains and food
• The Nicaraguan government affirmed at the World Food Summit in 2000 of
its commitment to reducing the prevalence of extreme poverty by half by
2015, as well as reducing child malnutrition, expanding sanitation services,
and reducing illiteracy.
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Population Description
 235

million on 13,000 islands

 Fourth

most populous nation

 Density:


61% on 7% of the land

Java, Bali, and Madura

 300

ethnicities, 750 languages & dialects

 86%

Muslim, 11% Christian

Resources & Climate
 Labor
 Natural






resources

Agriculture
Logging
Mining
Oil and gas
Natural rubber

Politics
 Presidential
 VP

and President elected directly

 President


selected council

Economics, social issues, and security

 MPR


republic

main legislative body

Two lower houses: DPR & DPD

 Divided

into 33 provinces

Associations
 Active



members of:

Association of Southeast Asian countries
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

 Improving

relations with Australia

Early Economic History
 1350
 16th


AD Hindu “Golden Age”

century, Europeans appear

Dutch East India Company 1602
 Export



sugar, coffee, spices

Negative experience?

 WW2

colonial rule ended

 Independence

in 1949

1949-1965
 President

Sukarno elected by parliament

 Sukarno’s

goals:




Reduce dominance of Dutch Companies, and some Chinese
Companies
FINEC (Financial Economic Agreement)
 Java

Bank nationalized, becomes Central Bank of Indonesia
 Followed by more nationalization


Benteng (Fortress) regulation

 1963

Congress elected Sukarno president for life

1949-1965 Continued




“Indonesian-style socialism” in a “Guided
Economy”
State owned companies and trading
houses
State owned business – Foreign loan
driven






Fertilizers, cement, paper, chemicals,
shipbuilding

Massive deficits, Inflation.
Agriculture > 50% GDP
Close to collapse in 1960

Suharto Regime 1965-1997
 Policies

influenced by IMF and World Bank

 Foreign

Investment Law 1967

 Domestic
 Inter


Investment Law 1968

Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI)

Established by Netherlands

 Rehabilitation

of dilapidated infrastructure

Suharto Regime continued
 Initial
 Oil

removal of barriers

boom 1970s reversal of policy

 Reinvestment



Health, education, infrastructure
Infant mortality drop 50%

 1974


of oil revenues

riots of “over-presence” of foreign investment

Foreign investors forced into minority shares in JVs

Oil shock 1978
 Rising


prices accelerated local preference regulations

Rupiah devalued

 Oil

price tumble 1982

 Oil

& gas exports dropped to 70% in 1983, then 40% in 1988





External debt rose to $57billion
Debt service ratio reached 40% in 1989
Policy focus shifted
 Import

substitution  export promotion

Trade reform 1980s
 Foreign


Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia “Growth Triangle” 1989

 Strong





and domestic investment restrictions relaxed

growth

Agriculture 51%GDP  17%
Industry 28%  42%
World Bank’s list of “high performing Asian economies”
Poverty fell to 11% by 1996

 1992

membership to ASEAN Free Trade Area

 1995

membership to WTO

Suharto Corruption
 Favoritism



Suharto family owning 17% market capitalization, 417
companies
State banks had 40% of all assets in 1997
 High

 World



towards family and associates

share of problem loans

bank total lending $25 billion

Viewed as a success
Progress from 50% to 300% GDP per capita over 30 years

Asian Financial Crisis 1997-1998


Thai currency floated



The managed float Rupiah came under attack






IMF approved $10 billion Stand-By Arrangement





Rupiah and Jakarta Stock Exchange plummeted
Real GDP 13% contraction
70% inflation
Jakarta Initiative Task Force (JITF)
Indonesia Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA)

Capital Flight

Reformasi
 B.J.







Habibie

IMF credit, not World Bank
Openness in governance
1999 rupiah appreciated to 7,000 per US$
Inflation & interest rates fell
Anti Corruption Commission 2004
Decentralization of 1/3 government spending

 Reforms

slow to implement

Economy Since 2006
SWOT Analysis

Strengths


GDP growth



Inflation Under Control and
Falling



Decreasing poverty rates






1999: 23.43%
2005:15.97%
2013: 13%

Decreasing Debt




2000: 90%  50%
Oil exports
Growth on domestic demand

Weaknesses
 High


Unemployment Rates

From 5.92%(Q1 2013) 
6.25%(Q4 2013)

 Low

Productivity

 Low

Investment on:




Education
Infrastructure

 Size

Restrictions

 Inflexible

Labor Market

 Corruption

Opportunities


Rich Natural Resources








R&D




Oil
Gas
Coal
Copper
Minerals

Regulations Protecting
Intellectual Capital

Real Exchange Rate Appreciation

Threats
 Increasing

Corruption

Levels of

 Lack

of Confidence

 High

Levels of Competition





India
Malaysia
Thailand

Foreign Investment


History of foreign direct investment with Dutch companies



Top three locations for U.S investors in 1950s



1980s and 1990s investment boom





Asian Financial Crisis





Korean Taiwanese companies relocated
Textiles exports doubled

FDI inflows to Indonesia collapsed
Foreign companies relocated to other countries

In 2006 Japanese companies dominated direct investment in Indonesia

Foreign Investment Rules and Regulations
 1967


Easy Investment Permission

 Tax


Capital Investment Coordination Agency(BKPM)

Incentives

Tax Holiday
 Corporate

Tax
 Withholding tax on dividends
 Batam




1978: ‘Bonded Zone’
1889: Status confirmed by law
1994: Growth Triangle Agreement
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